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Abstract—In SSYM 2001, Boneh, Ding, Tsudik and Wong
presented encryption and signature schemes based on the
identity-based mediated RSA (ID-MRSA), in which the users
are not allowed to decrypt/sign messages without the per-
mission of a security mediator (the SEM). This allows a
simple key revocation. Subsequently, in CT-RSA 2003, Ding
and Tsudik presented a security proof for these schemes. In
particular, they stated that ‘IB-mRSA/OAEP encryption offers
equivalent the semantic security to RSA/OAEP against adaptive
chosen ciphertext attacks in the random oracle model if the
key generation function is division intractable’. To make the
key generation function division intractable, Ding and Tsudik
used a division intractable hash function to generate division
intractable public keys. In this paper, we show that using a
division intractable hash function does not necessarily mean
that the key generation function is division intractable. We also
modify the ID-MRSA so that the generated keys are always
division intractable. We also show that these modifications do
not passively affect the efficiency of the ID-MRSA.
Keywords-Identity-based Cryptography, Mediated RSA
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of identity-based cryptography was suggested
by Shamir [1]. He also proposed a concrete construction
of an identity-based signature scheme. Identity-based cryp-
tography offers the advantage of simplifying public key
management, as it eliminates the need for public key certifi-
cates. In Shamir’s seminal paper, he successfully achieved
this goal by designing an identity-based signature based
on RSA, but the construction for identity-based encryption
could not be achieved using a similar approach since sharing
a common modulus between different users makes RSA
insecure [2], [3]. Sixteen years later, Sakai, Ohgishi and
Kasahara [4] proposed the first identity-based cryptography
and independently, Boneh and Franklin [5] proposed the first
reliable and provably secure identity-based cryptography,
which is based on Weil pairings over elliptic curves. Cocks
[6] presented a scheme based on the factorisation of a
composite integer. These cryptosystems opened a new era
in cryptography.
Boneh, Ding, Tsudik and Wong were the first to introduce
the notion of mediated cryptosystems in [7]. They designed
a variant of RSA that allows an immediate revocation of, for
instance, an employee’s key by an employer for any reason.
Their system is based on the so-called security mediator (the
SEM) architecture, in which the SEM is a the semi-trusted
server. If an employee wants to decrypt/sign a message, he
must co-operate with the SEM to decrypt/sign this message.
The idea behind their scheme is based on splitting the
secret key of an employee between the employee himself
and the SEM. Hence, without cooperation from the SEM,
the employee cannot sign or encrypt the message. This is
also helpful to monitor the security of sent/received secure
messages in the company. The SEM architecture was proven
useful [7] to simplify signature validation and enable key
revocation in legacy systems.
Subsequently, Ding and Tsudik proposed an identity-
based version of mediated cryptosystems [8]. It was the
first identity-based variant of RSA encryption successfully
proven secure under the random oracle model [9]. This
scheme is based on the optimal asymmetric encryption
padding (OAEP) [10]. This padding scheme is used to
randomise the message prior to encryption. It uses two
hash functions to mix the message with a random string.
This makes a deterministic cryptosystem, such as RSA, into
a probabilistic cryptosystem which does not give a priori
information about the message.
Identity-based mediated RSA is completely compatible
with public key RSA and it also supports optional public key
certificates. The vulnerability of this cryptosystem is that it
is based on sharing a common modulus between different
users and consequently, requires specific conditions to assure
its security: the SEM cannot be compromised during the
lifetime of the system and the hash function used to hash
the identities must be division intractable.
Our Contributions. In this paper, we review the security of
the ID-MRSA proposed in [8]. We show that hashing users’
identities using a division intractable hash function does
not necessarily generate division intractable public keys. We
show that an insider attacker can breach the ID-MRSA even
if the hash function used is division intractable. We present
two solutions that make the key generation function division
intractable and hence, the ID-MRSA is secure.
Throughout the rest of the paper, m represents the mes-
sage, c represents the ciphertext, k represents the security
parameter, p and q represent the primes that generate the
modulus n, e represents the encryption exponent, ϕ(n) =
(p− 1)(q − 1), λ(n) = Lcm(p− 1, q − 1), d is the private
key, du represents the user’s private key and dSEM is the
SEM private key. KG() is a hash function that hashes the
identity to the user’s public key.
Organisation of the Paper. The rest of the paper is organised
as follows. Section 2 reviews the related work done in this
area. Section 3 discusses the ID-MRSA encryption/signature
schemes and their implementation. Section 4 discusses the
security flaw of the ID-MRSA. Section 4 proposes two so-
lutions to overcome the ID-MRSA security flaw. The effect
of using these solutions on the ID-MRSA are discussed in
section 5. Finally, we conclude the paper in section 6.
II. RELATED WORK
Mediated RSA and its identity-based variant can be classi-
fied as key revocation schemes and two-party RSA schemes.
In the following, we review some of the related work done
on these two types of schemes.
A. Key revocation
The key revocation problem received the attention of the
cryptography community because a public key cannot be
used if the corresponding private key is compromised. An
initial solution to this problem is certificate revocation lists
(CRLs) [11], [12]. The CRLs hold the serial numbers of re-
voked certificates and should not be used. The disadvantages
of CRLs can be summarised in three points:
• When a user wants to encrypt a message, he must
verify the validity of the certificate that holds the
public key. This requires access to updated CRLs.
To achieve this goal, an online validation system is
required. This negates one of the advantages of public
key cryptography over private ones, which is the ‘self-
authentication’ of the public key certificates.
• A third party, called the validation authority (VA), is
required to validate each certificate. This third party
must be fully trusted because a user will not be able
to receive any messages if his certificate is mistakenly
revoked. In addition, if someone attacks the VA, the
whole encryption system will halt.
• Because CRLs must identify all revoked certificates,
they may be too long and consume the network’s
bandwidth. A solution to this problem is ∆ − CRLs,
which contain the revoked certificates since the last
issued CRLs [13]. So instead of sending a complete list
of CRLs, ∆ − CRLs are used to update the existing
CRLs.
To overcome the disadvantages of CRLs, an internet
protocol, the online certificate status protocol (OCSP) was
introduced [14] by Myers et al. Instead of sending a com-
plete list of revoked certificates periodically, which results in
substantial network bandwidth consumption. A client sends
to the VA a certificate validation request. Then the VA
responds with the status of this certificate (revoked, non-
revoked (valid), unknown). One disadvantage of OCSP is
that it does not support binding signature semantics because
it is impossible to ask a VA if a certificate was valid
in the past. Boneh [13] provided a technique to support
binding signature semantics, but unfortunately, there is no
infrastructure to support his idea.
Kocher [15] suggested an improved version of OCSP,
certificate revocation trees (CRTs). The VA can be consid-
ered as a global service provider, so it must be replicated
using many servers in order to withstand the entire load
of certificate validation requests. This means that the VA’s
signing key must be distributed securely over many servers.
This process is expensive and insecure. Kocher suggested a
solution to this problem: a highly secure root VA sends a
signed CRL-like data structure to other less-secure servers,
then clients can query these servers for their certificate
validation requests. The data structure is like a tree, where
the leaves are the revoked certificates and the root is a
signature of the highly secure root VA. This structure is
called a certificate revocation tree (CRT). If a user wants to
check the validity of a certificate, all he has to do is to send
a request to the nearest less-secure VA server.
A disadvantage of the current CRT structure is that the
whole CRT must be recalculated and sent to all servers if a
new certificate is revoked. This problem can be solved if the
CRT can be updated without the need to recalculate it all.
2-3 trees proposed by Naor and Nissim [16] and skip-lists
proposed by Goodrich [17] are two proposed solutions to
this problem.
Other examples of key revocation schemes include ef-
ficient revocation of security capability in certificateless
public key cryptography[18], the secure mediated certifi-
cateless signature scheme [19], the efficient mediated cer-
tificateless public-key encryption scheme without pairings
[20], pseudonym management using mediated identity-based
cryptography [21], mediated ciphertext-policy attribute-
based encryption[22], an identity-based mediated signature
scheme from bilinear pairing[23] and security-mediated cer-
tificateless cryptography [24].
B. Two-party RSA
Two-party RSA schemes are based on sharing the private
key of a user between him and a server. Examples of two-
party RSA are the Yaksha system [25] and S-RSA [26].
The Yaksha system is a security infrastructure that enables
key escrow and key exchange. It enables an authority to
know the short key session of a user without knowing his
long term private key. In the SEM architecture schemes, the
RSA private key of a user is shared between that user and a
Yaksha server so that the multiplication of their keys forms
the complete private key. When a user requests a session key
from a Yakasha server, the server generates a session key at
random, encrypts it with the user’s public key and partially
decrypts it using his partial decryption key and sends it to
the user. The user partially decrypts it to recover his session
key. Compared to the SEM architecture, this scheme is more
expensive and in addition, the Yaksha must be completely
trusted, unlike the SEM, which is partially trusted.
Another scheme which is based on two-party RSA is
S-RSA [26]. This scheme is proposed by MacKenzie and
Reiter [26] and is used to guard password-protected private
keys from offline dictionary attacks on a network device
captured by an adversary. Like the Yaksha system, a private
key of a user is shared between him and a server. The
user’s share of the private key is a function of his password,
while the server’s share of the private key is encrypted
within a token and stored in the network device using
the server’s public key. The sum of the two partial keys
forms the complete private key of the user. When a user
wants to issue a signature, the device sends the token to
the server, then the server extracts his partial private key
from the token to help the user to issue his signature.
Boneh and Franklin [28] provided an algorithm to share an
RSA key generation function between two users. Nicolosi
et al. [29] designed a proactive two-party signature for user
authentication. MacKenzie and Reiter [30] developed a two-
party DSA signature scheme which was provably secure.
III. THE ID-MRSA
the ID-MRSA is described as follows. In the setup phase,
PKG generates two safe primes p, q, then calculates n = pq.
He keeps p, q as secret system parameters, while publish the
modulus n to the users. After that, PKG generates the private
key for user A by hashing his identity to a value KG(), then
the PKG pads KG() with one to generate an odd public key
for user A. After that, he generates the corresponding full
RSA private key for user A, then splits the user A private key
between user A and the SEM. If user B wants to encrypt
message m to user A, he encrypts it normally using user
A’s public key. After receiving the message from user B,
user A sends it to the SEM to partially decrypt it. If user
A is revoked, the SEM refuses to decrypt the message and
returns ‘error’. If user A is not revoked, the SEM partially
decrypts the message and sends it to user A. After getting the
partially decrypted message from the SEM, user A generates
his own partially decrypted version of the message and then
combines it with the SEM’s partially decrypted message
to get his fully decrypted message. The algorithms of key
generation, encryption and decryption are shown as follows.
IV. THE ID-MRSA SECURITY
Based on [31] and [8], the ID-MRSA is secure in the
random oracle model. However, there is a special attack that
an insider user can attempt. He can manipulate the encrypted
message so that it can be decrypted using his private key.
Key Generation:
Input: two safe primes p and q
Output: du, dSEM
n = pq (Generating the modulus)
for user do
s = k − |KG()| − 1
e = 0s||KG()||1 (Padding the hashed identity with
one)
d = 1e mod(ϕ(n)) (Calculating the private key d)
du
r← Zn − [0] (Choosing randomly an element
duser,u from Zn − [0])





s = k − |KG()| − 1
e = 0s||KG()||1
C = Encrypt the message using RSA/OAEP
This can be done by finding a mapping function f(CA) =
CB .
Lemma 1: Assuming that there are two users, user A and
user B, user B is able to find a mapping function f(CA) =
CB and hence, decrypt/forge the encrypted message/sign a
message of user A iff ea|eb.
The proof of this lemma can be found in [8]. If ea|eb
i.e. eb = k × ea, we can construct a mapping function f
such that f(a) = ak mod (n). To solve this problem, the
user’s public key cannot be a factor of the product of the
other users’ public keys. To ensure that, Ding and Tsudik
Decryption:
Input: C, du, dSEM
Output: m
for SEM do





dSEM mod(n) (Calculate the partially
decrypted message of the SEM)
SendPDSEM to the user
for user do
PDu = c
du mod(n) (Calculate the partially
decrypted message of user)
M = (PDSEM × PDu) mod(n) (Decrypt the
message)
end
m = OAEP Decoding of M
The digital signature scheme is shown below:
Signing:














S = (PDSEM × PDu) mod(n)
end
S = OAEP Decoding of S
Verification:
Input: h, S, n, k,KG()
Output: h
s = k − |KG()| − 1
e = 0s||KG()||1
h = Se mod(n)
if h 6= h then
return (ERROR)
end
used a division intractable hash function to map a user’s
identity to his public key (KG()). This notion of division
intractable hash functions was proposed by Gennaro et
al.[32]. A hash function H() is said to be division intractable
if it is unfeasible to find a set of values (X1, X2, ..., Xn, Y ),
such that H(Y )|
∏
i(H(Xi)). Based on that, the authors of
[8] stated that, ‘IB-mRSA/OAEP encryption offers equivalent
the semantic security to RSA/OAEP against adaptive chosen
ciphertext attacks in the random oracle model, if the key
generation function is division intractable’. In this section,
we prove that Ding and Tsudik’s claim is wrong. Using
a division intractable hash function does not necessarily
generate division intractable public keys because the output
of the hash function KG() is padded with a ‘one’. The
public key is e = KG()||1 [8] or e = KG()||00000001
[9]. This means that e = 2KG() + 1 as in [8] or e =
8KG()+1 as in [9]. This multiplication and addition change
completely the property of the public key and it is likely,
with overwhelming probability, to lose its property of being
division intractable. For example, if |KG(ID1)| = 6 and
|KG(ID2)| = 19, these two values are division intractable,
but if we calculate e1 = 2|KG(ID1)|+ 1 = 2× 6 + 1 = 13
and e2 = 2|KG(ID2)|+1 = 2×19+1 = 39, we can see that
e1 and e2 are no longer division intractable (e2 = 3e1) and
consequently, lemma 1 can be used to attack the ID-MRSA
Table I







although the used hash function is division intractable. Real
life values that represent the same idea are shown in table
1. These numbers are in hexadecimal.
In the following subsections, we show how this simple
notice can be used by an insider one-wayness adversary to
attack the ID-MRSA. The first attack is a direct application
of lemma 1. The second attack is a common modulus attack
against the ID-MRSA. For the signature scheme, we prove
that, if such a mapping function exists, an insider attacker
can forge the signature of another user without knowing his
private key.
A. Attacks on the ID-MRSA Encryption scheme
The first attack applies when the effect of using an
intractable hash function is canceled by padding the output
with one and hence, the resulting public keys are in the form
of (eB = k × eA). If this happens, user B can decrypt the




and then decrypt this message using his private key. This
vulnerability can be used by an insider adversary user B to
attack an encrypted message of user A. This attack is done
as follows:
• user B chooses an identity IDB such that eB = k×eA,
where k is an integer.
• At the challenge phase, user B sends to the challenger
any two messages m1 and m2 and the identity IDA.
• The challenger will toss a fair coin b ∈ [0, 1] and will
send C ← Enc(mb) to user B.
• user B then calculates CB = C
eB/eA
A mod (n).
• user B sends CB to the SEM for decryption.
• After decryption, user B can successfully find b′ = b.
The gravity of this attack is making the ID-MRSA vulnera-
ble against one-wayness adversary; not only can user B dis-
tinguish between two messages m1 and m2, he can decrypt
it as a message of his own. To illustrate this attack, we pick
some toy examples. w.l.g, this attack can be applied in real
time values. In this scenario, we assume that there are three
users using this cryptosystem: user A, user B and user C with
KG(IDA) = 7 , KG(IDB) = 22 and KG(IDC) = 6.
We can see that these values are division intractable. But
if we calculate their public key eA = 2KG(IDA) + 1 =
2×7 +1 = 15, eB = 2×KG(IDB) +1 = 2×22 +1 = 45
and ec = 2KG(IDC)+1 = 2×6+1 = 13. We can see that
eB = 3eA. In the following, we will show that user B can
convert the encrypted message of user A to an encrypted
version of his own and let the SEM decrypt it for him.
Assume that the two primes were p = 23 and q = 47, the
modulus is n = p×q = 47×23 = 1081. If message m = 12
is encrypted to CA = meA mod n = 1215mod 1081 = 864
and sent to user A. User B takes a copy of CA and computes
CB = C
eB/eA
A mod n = 864
3 mod 1081 = 380. If the
same message was sent to user B, then CB = meBmod n =
1245 mod 1081 = 380. This means that user B successfully
converted the encrypted message of user A to an encrypted
version of his own and he can now decrypt this message
without the need to know the secret key of user A.
There is a second attack in which if the same message was
sent to two users, user A and user B, user C with public key
satisfies gcd(eA, eB)|eC can decrypt this message by using
the following attack:
• Assuming that g = gcd(eA, eB)|eC , user C finds the
values of a and b such that a× eA + b× eB = g using
extended euclidian algorithm.
• After obtaining a and b, user C calculates Cg = CaA ×
CbBmod (n) = m
aeA+beBmod (n) = mgmod (n)






and then he can decrypt it using his private key. We use an-
other toy example to illustrate this attack. Assume that three
users, user A, user B and user C, have the following outputs
of the hash function: KG(IDA) = 25 , KG(IDB) = 7 and
KG(IDC) = 13. We can see that these values are accepted
values for a division intractable hash function. Calculating
their public keys: eA = 2KG(IDA) + 1 = 2×25 + 1 = 51,
eB = 2KG(IDB) + 1 = 2 × 7 + 1 = 15 and ec =
2KG(IDC) + 1 = 2 × 13 + 1 = 27. We can also see
that these values are division intractable; (eBeC) - eA. We
will assume that m = 12 and as in the previous scenario,
n = 1081, then CA = meA mod n = 1251 mod 1081 =
108 and CB = meB mod n = 1215 mod 1081 = 864.
For user C to attack this message, he first calculates g =
gcd(eA, eB) = gcd(51, 15) = 3 and then he finds, using the
extended euclidean algorithm, two values a and b such that
aeA + beB = g. In this scenario, a = −2, b = 7. Then he
gets Cg = mg mod n = maeA+beB mod n = Cg = CaA ×
CbBmod (n) = 12
3 mod 1081 = 108−2×8647 mod 1081 =
647. Then he finally obtains CC = C
eC/g
g mod n =
meC mod n = 64727/3 mod 1081 = 1227 mod 1081 =
432 which represents the original message m encrypted in
his own key. This type of attack can be dealt with using
OAEP. The probability that two messages are padded using
the same random padding is negligible (about 2−160). So
if the same message were encrypted twice using different
OAEP padding, then Cg 6= CaACbB mod n and the attack
fails. So the advice is do not encrypt the same message
with the same padding to different users.
B. Attack on the ID-MRSA signature scheme
In this subsection, we present an attack on the ID-
MRSA signature scheme even with division intractable hash
function. We assume that there are two users, user A and
user B, and show that user B can forge the signature of
user A without knowing the private key of user A using the
following steps, as long as a mapping function between their
public keys exists:
• user B signs the message m with the SEM using his
private key.
• After obtaining his signed message (mB), he calculates
the forged signature of user A: mA = mkB mod n,
where k = eB/eA.
• mA can be verified using the public key of user A.
The proof of the correctness of this attack is described as
follows:
ebhb = 1 modϕ(n)
eb = kea
keahb = 1 modϕ(n)
ea(khb) = 1 modϕ(n)
eaha = 1 modϕ(n)
We now give a toy example of this attack using the same
parameters of the encryption scenario: KG(IDA) = 6 ,
KG(IDB) = 19, p = 23, q = 47, n = 1081, ϕ(n) = 1012
, eA = 2 × KG(IDA) + 1 = 2 × 6 + 1 = 13 and eB =
2×KG(IDB) + 1 = 2× 19 + 1 = 39. Using the extended
euclidean algorithm, we can find that ha = 545 and hb =
519. User B will work with the SEM to sign his message,
m = 12, the signed message will be mB = mhb mod(n) =
12519 mod 1081 = 6. After that, he will generate a forged
signature of user A by calculating mA = m
eB/eA
B mod(n) =
63 mod 1081 = 216, then he will send(12, 216) as a forged
signature of user A. If user C wants to verify this message,
he will calculate m = meAA mod(n) = 216
13 mod 1081 =
12, which is the same as the sent message.
V. THE ID-MRSA-V2
After reviewing the security flaw of the ID-MRSA en-
cryption/signature schemes, we present two solutions that
correctly make the ID-MRSA secure against these types
of attacks. We denote the ID-MRSA with these solutions
Figure 1. The distribution of primes
applied as the ID-MRSA-V2. These solutions must satisfy
the following conditions:
• There is a deterministic one-to-one mapping function
that maps the identities of the users to their public keys.
• This function must be division intractable.
• The generated public keys must be co-prime with ϕ(n).
The first solution ensures that the maximum public key is
less than three times the smallest public key, i.e. eM < 3em.
The subscript M denotes maximum while the subscript
m denotes minimum. One can see that this completely
eliminates the problem. To achieve this goal, the relation
between the hash function of the maximum and minimum
public keys must be:
eM < 3em
2|KGM |+ 1 < 3(2|KGm|+ 1)
2|KGM |+ 1 < 6|KGm|+ 3
2|KGM | < 6|KGm|+ 2
|KGM | < 3|KGm|+ 1
If the inequality |KGM | < 3|KGM | + 1 holds, then all
public keys are division intractable. The only disadvantage
of this solution is that it limits the space of the hash function.
Another solution to fix this security flaw is mapping the
users’ identities to public keys that are primes. Hence,
the public keys will be division intractable. To generate
primes from identities, we first use a collision resistance
hash function, a = H(ID) and then apply the following
function:
f(a) = (a− 1)× step + 1.
where step is a value used to generate unique primes. After
that, we check if f(a) is a prime. If it is, then e = f(a).
If not, find the next smallest prime larger than f(a). The
algorithm is shown as follows.
a = H(ID)
f(a) = (a− 1)× step + 1




where NxPrime(x) is a function that finds the
smallest prime larger than x.
This function must satisfy the following conditions to
perform correctly:
• The hash function must be collision resistant: it is
unfeasible to find two different values X,Y such that
a = H(Y ) = H(X). This guarantees that each identity
is mapped to a unique public key.
• The value of step is as follows. The step value must be
chosen carefully such that Pa < f(a+1) for any value
a. This will guarantee that each identity will be mapped
to a unique prime. Fig (1) shows this idea. The value of
step can be determined by finding a value greater than
the maximal prime gap, which is the gap larger than
the gaps of smaller primes. For primes less than 240, a
value of step greater than 1476 can be safely used [33].
• If the mapping function satisfies the above conditions,
it will resist the first attack to the encryption scheme
because we can guarantee that the generated public keys
are primes and primes satisfy the division intractable
property. On the other hand, however, it cannot with-
stand the second attack because since all the public keys
are primes, their greatest common divisor (gcd) is one,
and anyone can recover the message without knowing
the secret key. The only solution for this attack is not
to use the same padding in OAEP when encrypting
the same message to multiple users. For the signature
schemes, since the public keys are division intractable,
there is no relation between their private keys and such
an attack will fail.
After fixing these drawbacks, the ID-MRSA can be
proven CCA2 secure in the random oracle model using
the same methodology explained in [8] or [31].
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
the ID-MRSA-V2 was implemented using MIRACL soft-
ware C library and its performance was compared with the
ID-MRSA and RSA. The PC that was used to run these
tests has a processor Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-2410M CPU @
2.30GHz (4 CPUs),and 4096MB RAM. Table 2 shows the
test results. The results are in ms.
From these results, we can see that:
• NxPrime does not affect the performance of the ID-
MRSA, because the gaps between consecutive prime
numbers are known to be quite small[33].
• The results of the key generation of RSA are larger than
those of the ID-MRSA and the ID-MRSA-V2, because
the key generation of the ID-MRSA and the ID-MRSA-
V2 is for each user, so it does not involve the prime
key generation that exists in RSA key generation.
• The encryption time increases slightly with the key
length, so the key length is not problematic. This can
be seen also in the encryption times of the ID-MRSA
and IDMRSA-V2: although the key of the ID-MRSA-
V2 is larger than that of the ID-MRSA by the value of
step, the times are almost the same.
Table II
THE TIME RESULTS
The Process Modulus Key Size RSA the ID-MRSA the ID-MRSA-V2
Key Generation
1024 Bits
16 Bits 17.19 0.13 0.11
128 Bits 22.04 0.13 0.13
160 Bits 19.8 0.14 0.14
2048 Bits
16 Bits 128.26 0.17 0.16
128 Bits 130.26 0.14 0.14
160 Bits 127.86 0.16 0.16
Encryption / Verify
1024 Bits
16 Bits 0.03 0.06 0.05
128 Bits 0.03 0.03 0.05
160 Bits 0.03 0.05 0.03
2048 Bits
16 Bits 0.03 0.06 0.06
128 Bits 0.01 0.06 0.05
160 Bits 0.03 0.06 0.06
Decryption / Sign
1024 Bits
16 Bits 0.14 0.12 0.14
128 Bits 0.13 0.13 0.14
160 Bits 0.14 0.13 0.13
2048 Bits
16 Bits 0.22 0.22 0.22
128 Bits 0.23 0.23 0.23
160 Bits 0.22 0.22 0.22
• The decryption times are longer than the encryption
time in all schemes. This drawback is actually inherited
from RSA, because the decryption keys are extremely
large (of the length of n).
• The times consumed by all these schemes are propor-
tional to the modulus size.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we found some security issues of the ID-
MRSA. We showed that using a division intractable hash
function does not necessarly guarantee that the generated
public keys are also division intractable. Consequently, the
cryptosystem may not be secure even if the hash function
used is division intractable. We proposed two solutions to
overcome this drawback. After applying these modifications,
the ID-MRSA is secure in the random oracle model if the
mapping function parameters have been chosen correctly.
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